Introduction
In the literature of economics (e.g., [l] , [g] ~ [14] ) the notion of utility differences has been much discussed in connection with the theory of measurement of utility.2 However, to the best of our knowledge, no adequate axiomatization for this difference notion has yet been given a t a level of generality and precision comparable to the von Neumann and Morgenstern construction of a probabilistic scheme for measuring utility. (The early study of Wiener (1211) is not axiomatically oriented.) The purpose of this paper is to present an axiomatization of this notion and to establish the expected representation theorem guaranteeing measurement unique up to a linear transformation. raphy in [S] ) suggests there are cogent reasons for reviving the notion of utility .differences in'order clearly to separate utility and subjective probability. The interaction between probability and utility makes it difficult to make unequivocal measurements of either one or the other. The recent Mosteller and Kogee experiments ([EI]) may be interpreted as measuring utility if objective probabilities are assumed or as measuring subjective probabilities if utility is assumed linea,r in money. \ I n [ti] and f71 a detailed description is given of how utility may be experimentally measured by use of utility differences and a single chance event with subjective probability s.
The scheme may be briefly described as f o l l o~~.~ Let E" Se a chance event with subjective probability l/i, and suppose that the individual me are testing prefers outcome x to y, and outcome z to w. We present him with two alternative gambles, one,of which he must choose. Gamble 1 is that if E* occurs he gets x, and if E* does not occur he gets w ; Gamble 2 is that if E" occurs he gets z, and if E* does not occur he gets y. It seems intuitively reasonable to say that the individual should prefer Gamble 2 if and only if the utility difference between x and y is less than that between z and w. Once utility is measured by a procedure PATRICK SUPPES AKD X U R I E L WINET f I any formal role in our axiomatization and enters only via one particular empirical int,erpretation of t,he notion of utility differences. Consequently, interpretations of our primitive notions, completely divorced from any probability questions, are available for analyzing other approaches to utility theory. 4 justification for considering alternative schemes is the limited applicability of the probabilistic approach just described. It can and has been used in some laboratory experiments at Stanford (see [G] ), but, it is far from clear that it can 'oe seriously applied to market behavior. An interpretation of utility differences in terms of amountsof money is an obvious alternative. We present such a scheme in the form of a reduction sentence (the general character of reduction sentences is discussed in [Z] ). For simplicity we consider a fixed individual, say, Jones, and Tye assume that a prior satisfactory analysis of preference (as opposed to preference differences) has already been given.
( An obvious objection to (1) is that it has the effect, so often argued against, of measuring utility in terms'of money. However, the only assumption needed for (1) is that the relation between amounts of money and utility differences is monotonic increasing. A linear relation is not required. In our opinion such a monotonicity assumption is very reasonable for a wide variety of persons and situations.
,
An alternative reduct,ion may easily be stated in terms of work. It should be clear that the choice of money or work is not meant to entail any special status reductions is simply the existence of a commodity flexible enough to serve in different situations and such that its marginal utility is either always positive or always negative in the situations under consideration.
I n view of the many complex issues involved in assessing the workability, even in principle, of such reductions, it may be more useful to describe a particular experimental set-up which could be used to measure utility differences. For reasons which will become obvious, this scheme would not, be directly applicable to market behavior, but on the other hand it does not presuppose any fixed relations between money and other commodities.
For definiteness, we consider six household appliances of approximately the same monetary value, for inst'ance, a mixer, a deluxe toaster, an electric broiler, blender, a waffle iron and a waxer. A housewife who does not own any of the six is chosen as subject. Two of the appliances are selected a t random and presented to the housewife, say, the toaster and the waxer. She is then confronted with the choice of trading the toaster for the wafie iron, or the waxer for the blender. Presumably she will exchange the toaster for the waffle iron if and only if the utility difference between the waffle iron and the toaster is a t least as great as the difference between the blender and the, waxer (due account being taken of the algebraic sign of the difference). A sequence of such exchanges (repetitions a for these two commodities. What is needed as a basis for constructing other . ASIOhIATIZATIQN QF UTILITY 26 1 permitted) can easily be devised such that every utility difference is compared to every other. Our axioms specify for t,he set of choices sufficient ideal properties to gurantee the existence of a cardinal utility f~n c t i o n .~ From another conceptual standpoint (as pointed out to us by our colleague, Professor Davidson), we may think of the housewife as expressing a simple preference between pairs of appliances. Thus if she trades the toaster for the maRe iron she has decided that she would rather have the pair (waffle iron, wdxer) than the pair (toaster, blender 
The existence of such a function is taken to mean that "utilities are independent," that is, the commodities involved are neither complementary nor competitive with respect to each other. Viewed in this light, our axioms analyze the special conditions required for the existence of a cardinal utility function on a set of independent commodities. Whatever one's a priori feelings about the plausibility of the independence hypothesis there can be little doubt t,hat the experiment just described would provide a means of empirically testing the hypothesis,6 and thus would satisfy Samuelson' 
s methodological demand ([B], p. 183):
It may be argued thab regarded purely as a working hypothesis the facts do not sharply contradict the independence assumption. A little investigation reveals that such a bypothesis has not been testcd from this point of view. On the contrary, it is implicitly assumed from the beginning in the manipulation of the statistical data. Hence, one would have to go back t o examine the original empirical data.
It is interesting to note that the problem of complementarity occupies a position in this interpretation analagous to the position occupied by the problem of a specific utility of gambling in a probabilistic interpretation.
It is also our opinion that many areas of economic and modern statistical theory do not warrant a behavioristic analysis of utility. I n these domains, there seems little reason to be ashamed of direct appeals to introspection. For example, in welfare economics there are sound arguments for adopting a subjective view which would justify the determination of utility differences by introspective methods. Some psychological experiments on utility differences which essentially use introspective methods are reported in [4].
It is to be emphasized that the formal results presented in the remainder of this paper do not depend on any of the particular interpretations hare proposed,
Primitive and Defined Notions
Our axiomatization is based on three primitive notions. The primitive K is a non-empty, set, to be interpreted as a set of alternatives (objects, experiences, events, or decisions) available to a given individual a t a given time. The primitive Q is a binary relation whose field is IC; the interpretation of Q is that x Q y if and only if the individual does not prefer y to x. The third primitive is a quaternary relation R whose field is also K. In the intended interpretation x, y R z, w if and only if t,he difference in preference between x and y is not greater than the difference in preference between z and w. Our axiomatization assumes a rather complicated form if it is given only in terms of our three primitives. It is intuitively desirable t o use some defined notions whose interpretation follows directly from that of the primitives, Definition Dl. The above notions suffice for the statement of all but the last axiom, the Archimedean axiom. For the latter, one further quaternary relation is needed. -' u, v and u, v 
The difference between powers of E and of M may be brought out by interpreting x, y, z, and w as points on a line. The interpretation of x, y &f3 z, w, for instance, is that the intervals (x, y ) and (z, w) are of the same length, and there are two intervals of this length between y and z. Of special significance is the fact that the interval (x, w) is four times the length of (x, y ) . On the other hand, in the case of the relation E3 no specific length relation may be inferred for intervals (x, 'w)' and (x, y).
As we shall see in Section 5, the proof of our representation theorem essentially depends on exploiting the properties of the powers of M.
Axioms
Using our primitive and defined notions, we now state our axioms for difference If x I y and x , z R u, v , then y , z R u, v; If B(y, x , z ) 
If B ( y , x , z ) and B ( w , u, u ) The interpretation of Axioms Al-A4 is obvious. Axiom A5 expresses a commutativity' property of R and means essentially that for pairs of elements to stand, in the relation R only their differences matter and not their relative order.
Axiom A6 means intuitively that between any two elements of K , there is a midpoint. This axiom represents a more reasonable assumption than, for i,nstance, a formulation requiring that between any two elements there exist an element some arbitrary part, say x 7 t h , of the distance between them. Indeed, the axiom as here stated, receives empirical corroboration in the field of psychology from the practice of "fractionation" and "bisection" experiments requiring the subject to select the tones in just the way described, and from the existence of laboratory equipment designed for such experimental use. (See, e.g., [l91 and [20] .) Also, the probabilistic experiments ([6]) described in the first section have demonstrated the practicality of finding such midpoints.
Axiom AIO means that if the difference between x and y is less than that between u and v, then there is an element t of K between u and v and the difference between x and y is not greater than the difference between u and t. Axiom A l l , the Archimedean axiom, means that if thedifference betweenx and y is not greater than that between u and v, and if x is not indifferent to y, then there are n elements of K equally spaced in utility between u and v such that the difference between any consecutive two of these elements is not greater than the difference between x and y.
Elementary Theorems
A rather large number of elementary theorems is required for the complete proof of our representation theorem for difference structures. In the present paper, however, we are concerned merely to sketch the main outlines of such a proof; and, for this purpose, it will be sufficient in this section to present definitions of certain relations, not needed for stating the axioms, but used in a key way to develop the required proof; and to state without proof several elementary theorems which describe typical properties of the relat,ions defined, or which figure eentrally in the sketched proof of the representation t,heorem. I n particular, we omit completely a large group of theorems which develops the expected properties of Q and R and of the other simple "qualitative" relations ( I , P, E, S, B ) described in Section 2 .
W e first introduce the notion of the quaternary relation N(a 
N ( a ) u , v i f and only i f x f u and there exists a z such that
The interpretation of N ( 1 ) , of course, is obvious. To say for a f P, that x , y N ( a ) u, v means that x and u coincide, and that there are a -1 equally spaced elements of K between u and v such that the difference between any two of them equals the difference between x and y. If x, y , u and v are interpreted as points on a line, this notion obviously corresponds to the intuitive notion of "laying off" an interval on another interval; that is, we interpret x , y N ( a ) u, v intuitively as meaning that if we start from u, and "lay off" an interval of the length (x, y) a times in the appropriate,direction, we obtain the interval (u, v ) . By means of the N ( a ) relation, therefore, we are able to express the quantitative fact that the length of an interval (u, v ) is a times the length of a subinterval ( x , y).
The sort of "multiplication" of intervals characterized by the N(.) relation possesses the expected properties; for example, we have the following theorem concerning ratios of intervals. A crucial, but less obvious property is stated in the following theorem. We now define a relation in terms of which most of the proof of the representation theorem is carried through.
Definition DB. H ( m , a ; n; b ) To say.that x , y H(k, a ; n, b ) u, v means intuitively that an (~/ 2 * )~~ part of the interval ( x , y ) is not greater than a part of t'he interval (u, u>. We may view our first, theorem on t,his notion as enabling us to specify a pa,rtial
We have, for example, the usual law for addition of exponents:
bound for the values of arguments satisfying the H-relation between two intervals.
Theorem 5.
If not x I -y and x, y H ( m , a ; n, b) u, v, then not u , v H ( n , b ; m + 1,
Since the H-relation can be thought of intuitively as n special sort of inequality, we would expect to be able to prove many of the lams governing inequalities. Thus Theorem G expresses a kind of transit,ivity property and Theorem 7 an intuitively simple conservation property. Theorems 8, 9, 10 and 11 assert cancellation and multiplication laws.
Theorem G . I f x, y H(m, a ; n, b) u, v and u, v H ( n , b ; p , Finally, we state two existence theorems for arguments of the H-relation. These theorems are the form in which we make use of our purely qualitative continuity axiom (Alo) and our Archimedean axiom (All) respectively. P, c> T, s.
and not x I y, then not x, y H(m, a ; p, c ) w, z.
ac; n, bc) u, v.
V .

Representation Theorem
Our desired representation theorem is an immediate consequence of the following lemma. (As a matter of fact, it is rather customary in the theory of measurement to label a lemma of this sort the "theorem of adequacy" and not to state explicitly a representation theorem. Cf., e.g., Prooj: Part 4. We begin by choosing two elements u and 2; in K such that u P v (if no such two elements exist, the proof is trivial). We next define for J: and y in Ir the set of numbers S(z, y ; u, u) . h rational number r is in S(x, y ; u, v) if and only if there a,re non-negative integers m and n and st positive integer b such that b 2 2" and r = (b2")/2" and z, y H(m, 1; n, b ) u, v.
Let T and r' be positive rational numbers. Using Theorems 8, 10, 6, 9 and 11, in that order, we may easily prove that
Using now principally Theorem 14 and Theorem 5 me may show that if not x I y then the set .%(z, y ; u, u> has a positive number as a lower bound. Since by Theorem 14 S(x, y; u, v) is not empty, w e conclude that it has a greatest lower bound. We use this fact to define the function f~u , u ) (~, y) is the greatest 1ower bound of S(z, y; u, v) . and not
Hence by Theorem 7, not x, y H(m, l ; m, 1) z, w, and thus by Theorem 10 and Dg, not x, y R z, w, which contradict,s the hypot,hesis of (3). S(z, w; u, v) .
Suppose, if possible, that ap < y. Then there is a positive E such that (a + E) (p + E) = y. Clearly we may choose a number r in the open interval (a, a + E) and a number q in the open interval (p, p + E) such that T is in S(x, y ; u, v) and q is in S(z, w; z, y). Since rp < y, rq is not in S(z, w ; ?L, v) , but this contradicts ( 5 ) , and we conclude that
v ) ( Z r w).
Suppose now that not z, y R z, w. By Theorem 13 it follows that there is an n and a b with b/2" < 1 such that z, w H(0, 1; n, b ) x, y, and we conclude that f(0,21)(zl w> < I. Combined with (6), this result gives U S :~(~~~) ( X , y) > f(u,v,(z, w), which contradicts our hypothesis, completing the proof of (4).
We now define the function 4(u,v) as follows. For every x in K ,
We see a t once that &u,y)(u) = O, and thus our choice of u corresponds to the choice, of an origin. (3) and (4) provide the basis for an obvious proof that (7) z Q y if and only if &u,v)(x) 5 (P(u,ll)(y).
To complete the proof of Part A we need to show that
From ( 3) and (4) we see a t once t'hat it will be sufficient to prove
Of the five possible cases that need to be considered for (9) me consider only the typical one where x P y and y P u. For this case we must prove: 
and by an argument similar to the above we may show that equality holds in (l2), thus establishing (9) for a typical case, and completing the proof of Part A. Part B. Using elements u and u in K as in the proof of (A), we define functions hl and h2 for every x in K by the equations:
where 41 and 42 are functions satisfying (A). Since u P u, we see a t once that
and that hl and h 2 satisfy (A). Thus in order to establish (B) it will be suscient to prove that
We give the proof for the case where u P x and x P v. Suppose, if possible,
We now consider the smallest integer, say, n*, such that x"* < E . (Since lzl(x) and h&) are both between O and 1, n* # O.) By Theorem 2 there exists an element, say, z*, such that u, z"N(2"') u , v. A simple argument shows that we must have: z* P x.
Suppose now that. there is an integer a such that u, z* N ( a ) u, z. It is easy to prove by induction that we must then be able to infer:
(3) h&) = h&) = a/2n*, which contradicts ( 2 ) .
ger b and elements z1 and z2 such that
Since on the supposition of ( 2 ) there is no such integer a, there must be an inte-
ju, z* N(6 + I) u, z2
lpi P x [x P z2 .
Using the induction which yielded (3), we have from (4),
+ 1 b
hz(z2) -hl(Z1) = o n ' -3 < E, I I and we also obtain from (4):
hl(Z1) < h&) < hl(Z2) hz(z1) < h&) < hz(z2).
Combining inequalities we conclude :
h,(%) -hdz) < h2(nz) -h&) < E , which contradicts (2).
. The proof of (1) is completed by a consideration of the four other possible cases for the position of z with respect t,o u and v. (Two of the cases are trivial: u I x and u I z.) Since (l) establishes (B), the proof of our lemma is finished. We would not expect to have a strict isomorphism between an arbitrary diff'erence structure X = ( K , Q, R ) and some numerica1 structure, since distinct elements which stand in the relation I are assigned the same number. Kowever by considering the coset algebra X / I = ( K / I , Q / I , R / I ) of X under I , we may easily establish such an isomorphism. (Since I is obviously a congruence relation on K with respect to Q and R, it should be clear that K / I is the set of all I-equivalence classes and that Q/I and R / I are the relations between equivalence classes corresponding to Q and R.)
We define the quaternary relation T for real numbers as follows:
if a, ß, y, and 6 are real numbers, then (Y, ß T y, 6
ifandonlyif I a -ß l 5 / r -61.
Let N be a set of real numbers. Then y e call an ordered triple (Ar, 6 , T} a numerical diflerenCe structure if N is closed under the formation of mid-points, i.e., if CY, ß, are in N , then (CY + ß/2) is in N . We then obtain the following representation theorem as an immediate consequence of our lemma.
Representation Theorem. If X = (li, Q, R ) i s a diflerenCe structure, then X I I = @/I, &/P, R / I ) i s isomorphic to a numerical diference structure. Moreover a n y Iwo numerical di$erence structures isomorplzic to X / I are related by a linear transformation.
